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ADMISSIBILITY OF INSURANCE POLICY LIMITS
The question of whether a jury should be informed of insurance
policy limits is a controversial issue in Louisiana. Many perceive the
problem as an evidentiary question of whether or not the limits should
be admitted into evidence. However, the insurance policy must be in-
troduced to establish jurisdiction under the Direct Action Statute, and
many insurers plead generally in their answers that the policy limits not
be exceeded in the event of judgment against them. Therefore, the
problem is more correctly viewed as a narrower question of whether,
in direct actions, the trier of fact should be informed of the amount
of the policy limits.
Those who oppose the policy of allowing the jury to consider the
amount of coverage generally oppose it on the basis that such infor-
mation is prejudicial and will cause the jury to award higher verdicts.
This comment will begin with a review of the policy behind Federal
Rule of Evidence 411, which prohibits evidence of the existence of
insurance to be revealed to the jury. This policy validates the fear of
jury prejudice when insurance is involved in a jury trial. Of course,
since Louisiana is a direct action state, the federal rule is not directly
applicable, but the approach taken in the Federal Rules of Evidence
offers some guidance for solving the unique Louisiana problem of whether
to allow a jury to be informed of insurance policy limits.
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has hinted at its position
on this issue, it has not yet clearly articulated that position. As a
consequence, confusion has developed in our jurisprudence by the courts'
attempts to predict what that position might be. This comment will
discuss and analyze this jurisprudence and will recommend a solution
to the problem of whether to allow the insurance policy limits to go
to the jury.
Federal Rule 411
Federal Rule of Evidence 411 sets out a broad general rule, subject
to certain qualifications, that evidence of liability insurance is not ad-
missible to show fault.' Two rationales are usually cited for the rule.
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Federal Rule of Evidence 411 provides:
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible
upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule
does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when
offered for another. purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control,
or bias or prejudice of witness.
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First, since insurance is not logically related to the issue of liability,
this fact is irrelevant. 2 The Advisory Committee's Note emphasizes that
"[alt best the inference of fault from the fact of insurance coverage is
a tenuous one . . . ."I The second reason is that knowledge of the
presence or absence of insurance might prejudice the jury and cause
them to decide the issue of liability or damages on improper grounds. 4
Such evidence may influence jurors to bring verdicts against defendants
in close cases.' More important is the concern that the mention of
insurance will invite higher verdicts than justified. Jurors may believe
that the defendants themselves are not required to pay, but that the
award will be paid by a "well-pursed and heartless insurance company"
which has been paid to take the risk. 6
The validity of this fear of verdicts influenced by the knowledge of
insurance has been questioned. Some feel that the passage of time and
the pervasiveness of insurance has eroded much of the danger of prej-
udice which resulted from bringing the fact of insurance into a case.7
When the rule originated, insurance coverage was not common, but
today liability insurance has become prevalent, and most juries probably
assume that defendants are insured.' Also, since many states make
liability insurance compulsory in some circumstances, the fact of insur-
ance becomes notorious under the law. 9 Thus, it is probable that the
existence of insurance is not as prejudicial today as in the past. The
results of some experiments, however, support the view that jurors are
influenced when insurance is admitted into evidence.
In one study conducted at the University of Chicago, 0 tape re-
cordings of mock trials based on actual trials were prepared and played
to persons actually on jury duty. The versions varied in their treatment
2. The first sentence of Federal Rule of Evidence 411 negates the notion that
negligence can be inferred from the existence of insurance. The notion is that insurance
may lead a driver to a "devil-may-care" attitude and cause one to act with abandon.
This, however, has no bearing on whether one's behavior was substandard on an occasion
in question. To the contrary, that a person obeys the law by purchasing insurance when
it is compulsory, or has the foresight to purchase insurance even when not required to
do so by law, suggests that he exercises a degree of responsibility which connotes carefulness,
not carelessness. See 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5362,
at 431 (1980).
3. Fed. R. Evid. 411 advisory committee note.
4. Id.; McCormick on Evidence § 201, at 593 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter
cited to this edition without reference to editor].
5. Phillips, Mention of Insurance During Trial, Trial Law. Guide 247 (1961); S.
Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 216 (1982).
6. McCormick on Evidence § 201, at 593; 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at
Common Law § 282a, at 148 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).
7. 10 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 411.03, at 198 (1982).
8. McCormick on Evidence § 201, at 596.
9. 2 J. Wigmore, supra note 6, § 282a, at 169.
10. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 Neb. L. Rev. 744, 753
(1959).
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of the defendant's liability insurance. The experiments indicated that
juries tended to award less when they knew an individual was not insured
than when they were aware that the individual had insurance. Where
jurors knew that a defendant was insured, an objection by defense
counsel and an instruction by the court to disregard the evidence alerted
the jurors to the defendant's insurance coverage, and consequently, the
awards increased significantly.
Another study that was conducted after several insurance companies
began an advertising campaign to protest inflated jury awards showed
that even a single exposure to one of the advertisements could dra-
matically lower the amount a juror was willing to award."
Almost without exception, writers have been critical of the policy
of Rule 411. Wigmore found the rule "impracticable"' 2 and belived it
doubtful that in the long run enforcement of the rule would lead to
any advance toward justice. 3 Others believe that it is an improper fiction
to pretend the insurance company is not a party, since the company
controls the litigation and will ultimately pay the judgment. 4 Morgan
attacked the policy by stating that its enforcement causes courts to
"indulge in a lot of nonsense."" Others have protested that the excep-
tions have inundated the rule. For example, McCormick commented
that because of the many exceptions which have developed, "the rule
has become a hollow shell, expensive to maintain and of doubtful
utility.' ' 6
Although Rule 411 expressly excludes the proof of liability insurance
to establish negligence or other wrongful acts, it does not require ex-
clusion of evidence of insurance when offered for "another purpose.""'
The three most common situations in which evidence of insurance has
been deemed admissible are set forth in the rule itself. The first per-
missible purpose is proof of agency, when that issue is contested. For
example, it is usually proper to show the existence of the employer-
employee or the principal-agent relationship by showing that an employer
or principal carries liability insurance on one alleged to be his employee
or agent. The second is to show ownership or control. If the question
is whether a defendant owns or has control over certain property,
evidence that the defendant carries insurance on the property is admis-
sible." The third permissible purpose is to show the bias or prejudice
of a witness. An attorney may cross-examine a witness to show any
11. Loftus, Insurance Advertising and Jury Awards, 65 A.B.A.J. 68 (1979).
12. 2 J. Wigmore, supra note 6, § 282a, at 148.
13. Id. at 169.
14. 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra note 2, § 5362, at 434.
15. 1 E. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 212 (1961).
16. McCormick on Evidence § 201, at 597.
17. 10 J. Moore, supra note 7, §411,03, at 198.
18. Annot., 4 A.L.R. 2d 761, 777 (1949).
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interest in insurance or bias against insurance companies which would
bear on his credibility. 19 It is necessary for the judge to weigh the
possible harmful effect of jury prejudice against the plaintiff's procedural
right to question a witness as to his adverse interest or bias.20 In all
three situations, the court should be guided by the principles stated in
Federal Rule 403,21 and the probative value must not be substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 2
The language "such as" used in Rule 411 indicates that the enum-
erated exceptions are only illustrative, 23 and cases have established ad-
ditional exceptions. One such exception is the "intertwined admission. ' 24
If a party's statement or admission bearing on the issue of negligence
or damages contains both an objectionable reference to insurance and
admissible evidence, the judge should determine whether the mention of
insurance is separable. If the admission cannot be separated without
substantially lessening its evidentiary value, the evidence may be admitted
regardless of the fact that the reference to insurance is included. 2 An
admission relating to the issue of negligence or damages is normally
highly probative, and even when it contains a nonseverable reference to
insurance, the probative value would likely outweigh any potential jury
prejudice.2 6
One problem in applying Rule 411 is that witnesses sometimes make
voluntary, unexpected, and unresponsive references to insurance during
their testimony. Following such a remark, the judge may declare a
mistrial;2 7 however, it is more common for the opposing party to move
to strike the evidence and have the jury admonished to disregard the
remark.28 Another problem occurs when the fact of insurance is im-
properly introduced by remarks and arguments of counsel, who willfully
make comments regarding insurance to influence a verdict or prejudice
the jury. Here too, the court may order a mistrial if the remarks are
made in bad faith.29 However, because knowledge of insurance on the
part of present day jurors is presumed and because of judicial skepticism
toward the insurance rule, the modern trend is toward a relaxation of
19. 21B J. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 12835, at 501 (1980).
20. Phillips, supra note 5, at 250.
21. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
22. McCormick on Evidence § 201, at 594.
23. See also the language "well established illustrations," Fed. R. Evid. 411 advisory
committee note.
24. 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra note 2, § 5368, at 466.
25. McCormick on Evidence § 201, at 595.
26. 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 41105, at 411-12 (1982).
27. McCormick on Evidence § 201, at 595-96.
28. 22 C. Wright & K.Graham, supra note 2, § 5369, at 474.
29. Phillips, supra note 5, at 252.
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the rule of automatic mistrial,30 and it is unlikely that the courts will
terminate the trial unless the opponent is in bad faith.3 Another problem
arises because jurors are often made aware of insurance through voir
dire. The general practice is that the jury may be questioned about
interest in or connection with an insurance company which has an interest
in the litigation, even though the company is not a party.32 But courts
require the parties to exhibit good faith in making such an inquiry. 3
In summary, evidence excluded under Rule 411 is inadmissible be-
cause it is not relevant to an issue in the case. Because the evidence is
not logically relevant, it is not admissible. Even when the fact of
insurance does have some probative force on an issue which makes it
logically relevant, the probative force is usually so slight that it is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.3 4 Taking into
account the low probative value and the possibility of jury prejudice,
evidence excluded under Rule 411 would probably not meet the relevancy
requirement of Rules 401 through 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
in any event. In this sense, Rule 411 is probably redundant, since the
same results should be reached in each situation in the absence of that
rule.35
Direct Action Statute
The most direct method of disclosing the existence of insurance is
to join the insurer as a defendant. At least two states allow joinder of
the insurance company as a defendant.36 In those states, admissibility
of the fact of insurance does not present the evidentiary problems present
in those states which prohibit joinder. An amendment to Rule 411 to
add "[e]xcept in jurisdictions or cases where an insurance carrier may
be made a party [or] sued directly upon a cause of action" was suggested,
but was not adopted because "the result is the same without it.''37
Louisiana's Direct Action Statute38 permits joinder of an insurance
company in all liability actions. Louisiana occupies a unique position
in that the Direct Action Statute allows a suit directly against the insurer
30. Snowhite v. State, 243 Md. 291, 221 A.2d. 342, 347 (Md. 1966).
31. 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra note 2, § 5369, at 474.
32. 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 26, § 41109, at 411-14.
33. Id.
34. 10 J. Moore, supra note 7, § 411.03, at 198.
35. 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 26, §. 41102, at 411-15.
36. La. R.S. 22:655 (1978); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 803.04 (West 1977). Wisconsin's statute
permits separate trials on the issue of liability and on the issue of whether the insurance
policy in question affords coverage.
37. Comment, Determining Relevancy: Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
reprinted in G. Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law 61 (Supp. 1978).
38. La. R.S. 22:655 (1978); See also discussion in Johnson, The Louisiana Direct
Action Statute, 43 La. L. Rev. 1455 (1983).
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without first establishing the liability of the insured. 9 In Louisiana, it
is often not possible to keep the jury unaware of the fact of insurance
since the insurer may be a party litigant. When the insurance company
is named as a defendant and appears in court to defend the case, it is
clear that Louisiana courts are not faced with many of the problems
arising under Federal Rule 411. For example, remarks to a jury which
might be objectionable in other states because of counsel's reference to
insurance, are not necessarily improper in a suit based on the Louisiana
Direct Action Statute. 40 Because the statute allows an insurer to be sued
directly, a Louisiana judge is not required to weigh the probative value
against the prejudice of the evidence in deciding whether to allow evi-
dence of the fact of insurance to be introduced on the issues of agency,
ownership or control, or to allow such evidence to be used to impeach
a witness. The court does not encounter the dilemma of what to do
with the "intertwined admission." But naming the insurance company
directly does not necessarily eliminate the danger of prejudice sought
to be avoided by Federal Rule 411.41 If a Louisiana court fears the
possibility of jury prejudice, it may attempt to minimize the possibility
by appropriate jury instruction. 42
Although Louisiana has solved the evidentiary problems of admitting
the fact of insurance through its Direct Action Statute, it must deal
with the complex issue of whether to allow the jury to consider not
only the fact of insurance, but also the amount of insurance by revealing
the insurance policy limits to the jury. In some instances Louisiana
courts have so allowed. Some find this step a "shock to the normal
concepts of the trial lawyer." '43 And one Louisiana court, acknowledging
that the danger of prejudice is present by the mere fact that the insurer
is sued directly, recommended that "[in the absence of true necessity,
that risk [of prejudice] should not be increased by allowing the jury to
view the policy itself." 44 But others disagree. As Professor Alston John-
son has suggested, "To be consistent with the philosophy of the Direct
Action Statute, Louisiana hardly can take the position that the existence
of insurance or knowledge of the limits of that insurance is information
that the jury cannot be told." 45
Summary of Louisiana Jurisprudence
The problems presented by allowing a jury to consider policy limits
have been a matter of consideration and debate in many Louisiana
39. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Harrington, 274 F.2d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 1960).
40. Id. at 326.
41. See Briscoe v. Stewart, 423 So. 2d 1198, 1201 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982) ("In
Louisiana, the danger of prejudice is often present by the mere fact that an insurer may
be sued directly as a party defendant."), cert. denied, 432 So. 2d 266 (La. 1983)..
42. See generally Comment, supra note 37.
43. 21B J.Appleman, supra note 19, § 12834, at 440.
44. Briscoe v. Stewart, 423 So. 2d at 1201.
45. Johnson, supra note 38, at 1537-38.
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decisions. The clearest situation in which the court has to decide on
the admissibility of the policy limits is when a defendant offers evidence
of his impecunious condition at the time of trial.
It is established in Louisiana that a defendant may present evidence
which tends to show his financial inability to respond in judgment.16
This "inability to pay doctrine" dates back to 189847 and has been
applied consistently by the courts ever since. 48 The purpose of the rule
is to protect a defendant who is unable to pay from being deprived of
everything he owns. 49 The rule is based on the equitable principle that
courts will not grant vain and useless relief or render a judgment
incapable of execution. 0 It may be used only for the protection of the
"poor" defendant, and may not be used to increase the award merely
because the defendant is affluent. The "inability-to-pay" principle applies
in mitigation, not in aggravation of damages.5
When the defendant pleads inability to pay, the amount of his
insurance coverage becomes relevant to the issue of damages. This
principle was exemplified in Suhor v. Gusse,5 2 in which the trial court
allowed evidence of the defendant's inability to pay and charged the
jury that it could consider the defendant's inability to pay damages over
the insurance policy limits, but failed to inform the jury of the amount
of insurance available. The supreme court found that the failure to
inform the jury of the policy limits in this situation was reversible error.
The court emphasized that the policy limits were relevant in this situation:
"Clearly, where the evidence of defendant's inability to respond in
damages is allowed for consideration in assessing damages, plaintiff is
entitled to introduce evidence of defendant's insurance coverage .... -53
Conversely, it seems that where the defendant does not raise the
issue of his inability to pay, evidence of his insurance coverage should
be excluded, and some cases have so held. The fourth circuit in Moffett
v. Lumpkin 4 found no error in the trial judge's refusal to let the jury
know the policy limits and held that the defendant's financial status
was irrelevant since he did not raise the issue of this inability to pay.5
46. Suhor v. Gusse, 388 So. 2d 755 (La. 1980); Daly v. Kiel, 106 La. 170, 30 So,
254 (1901); Tabb v. Norred, 277 So. 2d 223 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Williams v. Garner,
,268 So. 2d 56 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
47. Loycano v. Jurgens, 50 La. Ann. 441, 23 So. 717 (1898).
48. Guy v. Tonglet, 379 So. 2d 744, 746 (La. 1980), and cases cited therein.
49. Hartman v. Aschaffenburg, 12 So. 2d 282, 287 (La. App. Orl. 1943).
50. Williams v. Garner, 268 So. 2d 56, 61 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
51. Hartman, 12 So. 2d at 287.
52. Suhor v. Gusse, 388 So. 2d 755 (La. 1980).
53. Id. at 757.
54. Moffett v. Lumpkin, 382 So. 2d 278 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
55. The inability to pay doctrine presents unique problems when multiple defendants
are involved and only one pleads impecuniosity. See Daniels v. Conn, 382 So. 2d 945
(La. 1980), where the supreme court held that where there are solvent and insolvent joint
tortfeasors liable in solido, evidence of the insolvent defendant's inability to pay may not
be considered by the trial court in determining damages to be awarded to the plaintiff.
See also Barnett v. Vanney, 360 So. 2d 617 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) (The court held
19851
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Similarly, in Ashley v. Nissan,5 6 the trial judge refused to inform
the jury of the limits of the insurance policies applicable in the lawsuit,
where no defendant had pleaded the inability to pay. The first circuit
found that the trial court properly withheld from the jury the limits of
the insurance policies. The rationale of the majority was that to inform
the jury of the limits "would violate the established jurisprudence that
a defendant's ability to pay damages is not a proper subject of inquiry
where the purpose is to show his affluence or wealth." 5 7 The court
added that "there is no logical basis for admitting the amount of
insurance coverage and refusing to disclose an individual defendant's
financial status." 58
Judge Yelverton concurred in part, but dissented with this portion
of the opinion and asserted that the jury should be informed of the
limits of liability of every insurance defendant where any party requests
it. The supreme court denied the petition for certiorari but stated that
"although we do not approve that portion of the opinion which permitted
the policy limits to be withheld from the trial jury, we cannot say that
under the facts the result is incorrect." 5 9
Other courts have allowed evidence of policy limits to go to the
jury even where no defendant has raised the issue of his inability to
pay. In Dominigue v. Continental Insurance Company,60 the jury awarded
a verdict for the plaintiff against a driver and his insurer. The defendants
appealed the award, contending that the trial court erred in allowing
the jury to view the limits of the insurance policy. Here, the defendant-
driver did not plead inability to pay, but the jury was charged that an
insurance company is entitled to be treated fairly and impartially in the
same manner as an individual. The third circuit, in affirming the judg-
ment, found no error in allowing the jury to consider the limits. 6' The
court's reasoning was twofold. First, it relied on the language of the
supreme court in the writ denial of Ashley v. Nissan. Secondly, "the
ability of a defendant to respond in damages is well established as a
that allowing one defendant to give evidence of inability to pay and admitting limits was
prejudicial to the co-defendants). But see Cobb v. Insured Lloyds, 387 So. 2d 13 (La.
App. 3d 1980) (holding that it was proper to allow one of the multiple defendants to
plead inability to pay and admit his insurance limits).
56. Ashley v. Nissan, 321 So. 2d 868 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 So. 2d
478 (La. 1975).
57. 321 So. 2d at 874.
58. Id.
59. Ashley, 323 So. 2d at 478.
60. Dominigue v. Continental Ins. Co., 348 So. 2d 209 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
61. See also Courville v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 176 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1980), rev'd in part, 393 So. 2d 703 (La. 1981) (The court allowed the insurance
policies to be exhibited to the jury because both were introduced as evidence.); but see
Briscoe v. Stewart, 423 So. 2d 1198 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982) (The court found error
for the trial court to allow the jury to inspect the uninsured motorist policy, but the
error was harmless.), cert. denied, 432 So. 2d 266 (La. 1983).
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proper subject for jury consideration, ' 62 even though the defendant here
did not plead the inability to pay.
Judge Culpepper dissented, stating that because the supreme court
was not bound by its previous refusal to grant writs, the court should
follow Ashley until the supreme court specifically changed the rule. He
added that the limits should have been withheld because such evidence
was irrelevant to the amount of damages and clearly prejudicial. Judge
Culpepper pointed out that if either defendant had raised the issue of
the insured's inability to pay, the limits would have been relevant to
this issue, and therefore admissible into evidence.
Judge Stoker concurred, but expressed his apprehension in relying
on the Ashley writ refusal. He did not construe the supreme court's
language in the denial as necessarily laying down an unqualified rule
that policy limits constitute relevant information to be given juries in
liability suits absent facts that make them relevant. 63 He explained that
in Ashley the defendant-driver who had been held liable had actually
given testimony concerning his occupation, means and ability to respond
in judgment, although he had not pleaded impecuniosity. In his opinion,
the fact that the defendant had raised the defense of inability to pay
explained the supreme court's disapproval of the case. Judge Stoker
further discussed the unique facts presented by Dominigue which justified
admitting the policy into evidence even though the defendant had not
pleaded inability to pay. Continental Insurance Company in its answer
had admitted insurance coverage, but added that its policy was the best
evidence of its contents and limitations. It also had failed to disclose
its policy limits in its answer to plaintiff's interrogatories. Therefore,
by its pleadings and answers to interrogatories, Continental Insurance
Company made a trial issue of its policy contents and liability limits.
Judge Stoker stated that if a categorical rule regarding the admissibility
of policy limits must be adopted, the rule should be that the jury be
allowed to know the limits; however, he added that the preferable rule
would be to leave the question to the discretion of the trial judge by
allowing the judge to determine what are jury issues and what issues
are to be tried by the court alone.
A different panel of the third circuit was faced with a problem
almost identical to that in Dominigue in Ardoin v. Hartford Accident
and Indemnity Co.64 Again, defendant's inability to pay was not at
issue, but the trial judge allowed the jury to view various insurance
policies, in effect informing them of the policy limits. The court expressed
neither approval nor disapproval of the Dominigue holding, and held
that regardless of the correctness of the lower court's ruling, the defendants
were not prejudiced by the evidence, and there was no reversible error.
62. 348 So. 2d at 21i.
63. Id. at 215.
64. Ardoin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 350 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
i
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The first circuit again addressed the problem in Case v. Arrow. 65
The trial court entered a judgment pursuant to a jury verdict in favor
of plaintiff in an action brought as a result of an automobile accident.
The court of appeal found no error in allowing disclosure of the insurer's
policy limits to the jury even though the inability to pay was not pleaded.
The first circuit relied on the third circuit's interpretation in Dominigue
of the Ashley writ denial as being a clear pronouncement by the supreme
court that the ability of a defendant to pay, as evidenced by insurance
coverage, is a proper consideration for the jury.66 The first circuit, in
deciding Case, considered Ashley overruled.
In the recent third circuit case of Ponder v. Groendyke67 one of
the assignments of error was the trial court's decision permitting the
policy limits of all of the insurance carriers to be disclosed to the jury.
The trial court denied defendant's pretrial motion to prevent such dis-
closure. Even though a majority of the court found that the trial court
erred in permitting disclosure of policy limits to the jury, they held the
error did not warrant reversal since the jury's award fell below the
policy limits. The court reasoned that the financial status of a defendant
is irrelevant unless he places it at issue by claiming inability to pay.
A different panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal expressed
the opposite opinion regarding disclosure of policy limits to the jury in
Bishop v. Shelter Insurance Co. 68 At trial, defendants introduced two
insurance policies into evidence and requested that the jury be allowed
to examine the limits of coverage. The third circuit found that the trial
judge erred in refusing to allow the jury to see the policy limits, but
did not find the error to be prejudicial.
In addition to the inability to pay doctrine, the issue of presenting
policy limits to the jury has arisen in other situations. One such situation
is where the parties have stipulated to the amount of coverage and the
judge must decide whether the stipulation should go to the jury. In
Arceneaux v. Dominigue, 69 the trial court refused to inform the jury of
a stipulation concerning the liability policy and its limits. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling, but the supreme court
reversed, reasoning that "[iln a jury trial, the jury is entitled to know
all the evidence. ' 70 The court added that "[w]e know of no statute or
jurisprudence which, in the absence of agreement of the litigants, would
permit admissible evidence to be withheld from the jury."' 7'
65. Case v. Arrow, 372 So. 2d 670 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1979).
66. Id. at 677.
67. Ponder v. Groendyke, 454 So. 2d 823 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 So.
2d 1195 (La. 1984).
68. Bishop v. Shelter Ins. Co., 461 So. 2d 1170 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
69. Arceneaux v. Dominigue, 365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1979).
70. Id. at 1336.
71. Id.
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Another situation arises when an insurance company introduces its
policy to protect itself from excess liability. In Williams v. Bernard,72 an
insured sued his automobile insurer, seeking uninsured motorist benefits.
The jury returned a verdict in excess of the policy limits. Neither party had
offered evidence of policy limits. The trial court denied the insurer a new
trial for the purpose of proving its policy limits. The insurer appealed,
contending that it was prevented by law from introducing evidence of
its limits. The supreme court affirmed the denial, stating that it was aware
of no law which would prevent an insurer from introducing evidence of
its policy limits. The court added that this was a trial tactic which the
defendant had deliberately chosen to avoid the possibility that the jury's
decision would be influenced by its knowledge of the amount of coverage.
Analysis of Jurisprudence
Ashley v. Nissan was the initial case which sparked the debate over
whether or not the jury should be informed of policy limits. The first
circuit, in finding that the trial court properly withheld the limits of
insurance from the jury, clearly understood the inability-to-pay rule.
The majority decision was correct. Since no defendant had pleaded
inability to pay, the policy limits had no tendency in reason to prove
the amount of damage. Because the probative value was so low, it was
outweighed by the possibility of jury prejudice; therefore, the evidence
was properly withheld.
Judge Yelverton, in his dissent in Ashley, argued that the insurance
contract itself is admissible as the basis of jurisdiction. However, if an
insurer admits coverage in its answer or by stipulation, the insurance
contract is no longer at issue. He also reasoned that there is no foun-
dation for the fear of "insurance verdicts." However, that this fear
does in fact have a basis is evident in the case of Adams v. Ross. 73 In
that case, the defendant pleaded inability to pay and the policy limits
were revealed to the jury. The jury award of $60,000 exactly equaled
the total amount of coverage. The court reduced the award to $25,000
and noted that in reaching its decision the jury was probably influenced
by the policy limits. In Williams v. BernardP4 the insurer deliberately
chose not to offer its policy limits into evidence to avoid possible jury
prejudice. Implicit in this trial tactic is an acknowledgement by the
defense counsel that the revelation of the limits might invite prejudice.
That there is merit in the fear of insurance verdicts is also shown by
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. The inclusion
of Rule 411, which specifically addresses this fear of prejudice, implies
that the drafters believed that potential jury prejudice is a reality. It
72. Williams v. Bernard, 425 So. 2d 719 (La. 1983).
73. Adams v. Ross, 300 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
74. Williams v. Bernard, 425 So. 2d 719 (La. 1983).
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follows then, that if even the fact of insurance has a prejudicial effect
on juries, the amount of insurance would have an even greater influence
on the jury's decision.
The supreme court's writ denial in Ashley v. Nissan has left many
unanswered questions. Judge Stoker, in his concurrence in Dominigue
v. Continental Insurance Co. explained the probable reasoning behind
the language of the supreme court. Because the defendant had given
testimony of his inability to respond in damages, the case probably fit
under the inability-to-pay rule which would have made the policy limits
relevant. However, the third circuit, relying on the Ashley writ denial,
reached a different result in Dominigue. The fact that the writ denial
can be explained by the unique facts of Ashley makes the reasoning of
Dominigue less sound. In addition, the court stated that the ability of
a defendant to respond in damages is a proper subject for jury con-
sideration. This statement is correct; however, its application here is
incorrect since the defendant did not plead inability to pay. The purpose
of the inability-to-pay doctrine clearly indicates that it cannot be used
to increase the award merely because the defendant is affluent. 75 Even
though the reasoning of the court is not sound, the result of Dominigue
was probably correct since the defendant insurer had made a trial issue
of its policy limits in its pleading and through discovery.
Following the writ denial in Ashley and the interpretation of it in
Dominigue, the first circuit, in Case v. Arrow, considered Ashley over-
ruled. As stated above, the decision in Dominigue is not properly rea-
soned, although the result is correct, and the writ denial can be explained
by the unique facts of Ashley. Therefore, the decision in Case is not
properly grounded, and Ashley should still be controlling.
In the recent case of Ponder v. Groendyke, the third circuit again
reached the correct result in finding the limits irrelevant because the
defendant had not put his financial status at issue. Judge Domengeaux
concurred, but stated that the clear trend in Louisiana is admissibility
of limits before the jury even when the inability to pay is not at issue.
In supporting his opinion, he cited Dominigue v. Continental Insurance
Co. and Arceneaux v. Dominigue. As discussed above, his reliance on
Dominigue is questionable. The court reasoned in Arceneaux that the
jury is entitled to know all the evidence. The court's statement that
there is no statute or jurisprudence which would permit admissible
evidence to be withheld from the jury is a correct one; however, in this
case, the defendant did not plead the inability to pay, and therefore,
the limits did not become relevant. Because this evidence was not rel-
evant, it could not be considered admissible on the issue of quantum.
The supreme court has not taken a clear stance on the issue of
when the jury is to be informed of policy limits. Clearly the writ denial
75. See supra notes 49-50.
1310 [Vol. 45
COMMENTS
in Ashley has not clarified the supreme court's position and the Ar-
ceneaux decision offers even less guidance. The statement in Williams
v. Bernard that no law prevents an insurer from introducing evidence
of limits offers no rule governing whether policy limits are admissible
before the jury. The supreme court did, however, in Suhor v. Gusse
take the clear position that limits become relevant when a defendant
puts his ability to pay at issue. In considering the issue of whether the
jury should view the policy limits when the ability to pay is not at
issue, the court of appeal in Bishop acknowledged that "[i]n the absence
of an opinion with a full discussion of the issue by our Supreme Court,
there is certainly room for argument on both sides."17 6 However, by
relying again on the writ denial in Ashley and on Arceneaux, the court
of appeal concluded that the supreme court preferred to allow the jury
to be informed of insurance policy limits.
From a careful review of the jurisprudence, it is not difficult to
justify both the statement in Bishop that the supreme court "prefers to
let the jury see the policy limits""7 and Judge Domengeaux's statement
in Ponder that the trend in Louisiana is toward admissibility of policy
limits before the jury even when the inability to pay is not an issue.
But until the supreme court takes a clear position regarding this issue,
no categorical rule can be presumed.
CONCLUSION
The results reached through the application of Rule 411 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, in determining whether the fact of insurance
is admissible, are reached through a basic relevancy analysis as set out
in Rules 401 through 403. Evidence is admissible if the probative value
outweighs the risk of harm or prejudice. Although the evidentiary prob-
lems addressed by Rule 411 regarding the admissibility of the fact of
insurance are avoided by the Louisiana Direct Action Statute, Rule 411
offers guidelines which can be used by Louisiana courts in solving the
problem of whether to allow policy limits to go before the jury. A
similar relevancy analysis should be applied by Louisiana courts in
deciding whether to allow insurance policy limits to be admitted for
consideration by the jury. The probative value of the evidence should
be weighed against the risk of harm.
Where a plaintiff offers the policy limits on the issue of quantum,
clearly the potential prejudice outweighs any probative value; therefore,
the amount of insurance should not be admissible on the issue of
damages. But where a defendant pleads the inability to pay, the probative
value of the amount of insurance increases so as to outweigh any possible
prejudice, and the policy limits become relevant.
76. Bishop, 461 So. 2d at 1180.
77. Id.
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Cases in which a defendant does not plead the inability to pay
present more difficult considerations. As seen in Williams v. Bernard,
if an insurance company fails to admit its policy limits into evidence,
it may be required to pay any judgment in excess of those limits. To
limit its liability to the amount of the policy, an insurer must plead its
limits. Because the insurance company must introduce its policy into
evidence to limit its liability, the judge is faced with the dilemma of
whether to allow the policy to be considered by the jury. The problem
becomes a question of who should decide the issue of the amount of
coverage-the judge or the jury.
But if the insurance company admits its policy limits in the pleading,
through discovery or by stipulation, the amount of coverage is no longer
an issue of fact to be decided by the jury, and. therefore, there is no
justification for allowing the policy limits to go to the jury.
In his concurring opinion in Dominigue v. Continental Insurance
Co., Judge Stoker suggested that perhaps the answer to the dilemma is
"a matter for legislative consideration rather than judicial resolution. ' '78
The legislature could solve this problem by enacting a procedural article
which would provide that when an insurance company in a direct action
seeks to introduce its policy limits, that issue goes to the judge. The
jury would not be required to consider the evidence unless a defendant
has pleaded the inability to pay. Such an enactment would clarify the
confusion in our jurisprudence, which has developed as a result of
Louisiana's Direct Action Statute, over whether to allow a jury to have
knowledge of the policy limits. The article would also avoid any pos-
sibility that the jury would decide the issue of damages based on the
amount of coverage, and would eliminate the fear of further jury prej-
udice which might result.
In the absence of action by the legislature, Judge Stoker offered a
solution to the problem by pointing out that a trial judge may exercise
much control through the use of written interrogatories and forms of
verdicts to be submitted to the jury under Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure articles 1811 and 1812 (now articles 1812 and 1813). "By
such a course of action, the question of coverage and amount of coverage
become in effect, non-jury questions. ' 79 In this situation, the judge
would decide the question of the amount of coverage. The judge, aided
by the guidelines offered in Federal Rule of Evidence 411, could withhold
evidence of policy limits from the jury if in his discretion he determined
that the potential prejudice of allowing the information to be considered
by the jury outweighed the probative value of the evidence.
Susan A. Row
78. Dominigue, 348 So. 2d at 218.
79. Id.
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